Abstract This paper investigates the significance of non-resident taxation and other investment costs in determining equity returns in emerging stock markets. Capital gains taxes on nonresidents are shown to significantly increase required pre-tax equity returns, which is consistent with a generally limited creditability of foreign capital gains taxes in the capital exporting countries. Most countries tax inflationary as well as real capital gains, which means that inflation can have an independent positive impact on the required equity return. Required returns are shown to decline with the level of stock market development, as measured by stock market capitalization relative to gross domestic output.
Introduction
The tendency of investors worldwide to hold primarily domestic securities points at the existence of important barriers to international capital mobility'. In early efforts to model capital controls, Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) Even when specific investment barriers are identified, empirical testing of the impact of these barriers on international asset pricing has proven difficult, as it is difficult to incorporate the cost equivalents of the range of international capital barriers into asset pricing models. The investment restric[ions considered by Cho, Eun and Senbet (1986), Bosner-Neal, Brauer, Neal and Wheatley (1990), and Gultekin, Gultekin and Penati (1989), for instance, do not allow for a straightforward computation of tax or transaction cost equivalents. These authors, instead, examine how changes in investment restrictions differentially affect the international pricing of assets and of risk.
The extent to which non-resident withholding taxes affect pre-tax equity returns depends, in part, on whether foreign investors can obtain tax relief in the fonn of a tax credit or deduction from their national tax authorities. The developed countries, including the United States, generally provide tax relief in the form of a tax credit or deduction primarily for z foreign dividend taxes. Withholding taxes on foreign capital gains taxes, therefore, tend to be final taxes that are borne fully by the foreign investor, for a given pre-tax return. As compensation, the investor requires a higher pre-tax rate of return. This paper investigates empirically the roles of (i) non-resident taxation and of (ii) proxies of other non-tax investment costs in explaining equity re[utns in emerging stock markets. As in the work of Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) , tax barriers are explicitly incorporated in an asset pricing model, and it is straightforward to relate required pre-tax equity returns to withholding taxes applied to non-resident holdings. Empirically, pre-tax equity returns significantly reflect the variation in non-resident capital gains taxes. Most countries do not index their capital gains taxes to adjust for inflation. Thus inflation by itself increases the capital gains tax base, and the necessary pre-tax rate of return on equiry. This paper shows that the taxation of purely inflationary capital gains can indeed have an independent positive impact on the required rate of return on equity in emerging stock markets. Proxies of non-tax investment costs are easily incorporated in the main analysis. Stock market development, as measured by a higher ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product, is shown to reduce required pre-tax rates of return. The data of this study is for 18 emerging stock markets, from the Emerging Markets Data Base of the International Finance Corporation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a mean-variance intetnational asset pricing model that includes non-resident dividend and capital gains taxes.
Section 3 describes the data, and section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the paper's implications for (physical) investment and tax policy in developing countries.
The model
The model takes the perspective of a U.S. investor. The investor can invest in all developed and developing country equity markets. In addition, the investor can borrow and lend at a risk-free, pre-tax dollar interest rate, R~. The U.S. investor's foreign equiry returns are first taxed by the developing country. In particular, country i taxes the U.S. investor's dividends at a(withholding tax) rate r,a, while capital gains, measured in local currency, are taxed at a rate r;`. In calculating the capital gains tax burden, we will assume that capital gains are realized each period." In addition to developing country taxes, the investor is subject to a U.S. personal (or corporate) income tax rate, r,~. The rate rate r~, applies to ordinary dividend income as well as to capital gains.
[nterest income ( expenses) are further assumed to be fully taxable (tax deductible) in the U.S. The U.S. investor generaily can claim a U.S. tax credit for foreign taxes paid to alleviate the burden of double taxation. The U.S. (and other developed counuies) tend to offer more generous foreign tax credits for foreign dividend than for foreign capital gains taxes, and even in the former case several limitations may apply.b Let ry~and y, generally be the shares of foreign capital gains and dividend taxes paid that are eligible for a U.S. credit. B~-1-y~and B, -1-ry, then represent the incidences of the foreign capital gains and dividend taxes on a U.S. investor -for a given pre-tax equity return. For a small country without capital market power, the pre-tax equiry return has to rise by the incidence rates times the assessed capital gains and dividend tax burdens to compensate the foreign investor. For a small country, the incidence of any taxes on a non-resident U.S. investor ultimately is on the U.S. Treasury or on the country itself.
Apart from taxes, differences in transaction costs associated with national equity markets can give rise to a variation in (risk-adjusted) net-of-tax equiry returns across countries. Let C, generally denote the dollar transaction costs per doliar invested in equity market i per holding period. This transaction cost consists of a straight brokerage fee or, for instance, of legal expenses necessary to protect the investor's assets. National differences in transaction costs can reflect differences in the quality of the legal and accounting infrastructure.
The starting point of our analysis is the standard capital asset pricing relationship, In (2) the subscripts -1 refer to the previous period. 
In the empirical work, the vector X; will consist of country dummies, the rate of inflation, a qualitative index of dividend repatriation restrictions, and linear and squared terms in the (MCAP~Y); variable, which is a country's equiry market capitalization relative to GDP. The latter variable is demonstrated to be a good index of costs associated with investments in a particular equity market, as reflected in equity returns. The X; vector is equal to a mean EX; plus a random vector e~.
Combining (1), (4) and (5), we can now restate the post-tax asset pricing relationship (I) in terms of pre-tax equiry retums as follows, R; -R~-Q; (Rm -R~) t B~TAXC; -BaTAXD; t bX; t n; where R; is the before-tax and before-transaction costs dollar return in equity market i, Rm is the before-tax, but after-transaction costs dollar return on the overall world equity portfolio (with a mean ERm and a random part e,,,), 
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In (8) and (9), P; stands for country i's goods price index.9 The variables CR; and CN; are assumed to be random variables with stochastic components e;" and e;`" The division of CL; into CR; and CN; allows us to estimate possibly different incidence rates of the foreign capital gains tax, as applied to dollar and additional inflationary capital gains. In particular, let é and g stand for the incidence shares of the real and inflationary parts of the foreign a m capital gains tax on the U.S. investor (for a given pre-tax equity retum, and divided by 1-~)
. After substituting for CL; from (7) into (6) and allowing for different incidence parameters, ga and é~, we can now rewrite (6) as follows, R~-R~-a( Rm -R~~) } b~~TAXCR~t b~~TAXCN~t BdTAXD~t SX~t n (10) with,
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quations (6) and (10) Summary information on mean stock market returns and related variables is given in Table 1 investors by most developed countries.
Summary data for all countries combined are given in Table 2 
Empirical results
This section presents tests of whether non-resident dividend and capital gains taxes affect the rates of return in emerging stock markets. From equations (6) and (10), we see that the error terms, n; and n. , are contemporaneously correlated across countries, as they have a common market error term, Em, multiplied by a country's post-tax beta. In addition, the right-hand-side TAX variables are genera(ly not exogenous to the error terms. The estimation, in this instance, is in three steps. In the first stage, the TAX variables are To start, we estimate the returns equations based on (6) and (10) with the rate of dollar appreciation rather than the dividend-inclusive return, R, as the dependent variable. The reason for this is that the dividend-yield in the data base is not very useful for high inflation countries. In the data base, the dividend yield is computed on a 12 month rolling basis, based on the domestic currency price index at the beginning of the 12-month period. As a result, computed dividend yields are unrealistically high for high inflation countties. corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
The regression in column (1) represents the base case of equation (6) The TAXC variable enters positively, with g~estimated to be around 3.1. If the U.S tax rate, t, is taken to be 113, then the corresponding estimate of g is 2.0. The evidencẽs uggests that capital gains taxes levied by developing countries on non-residents are fully reflected in higher pre-tax rates of equiry returns.
The DIVREST variable in the regression is a dummy variable that equals one if the country imposes any restrictions on the repatriation of dividends, while it is zero othetwise.
The variable enters the regression negatively, which suggests that dividend repatriation restrictions lower the pre-tax return on equity. This may reflect that repatriation restrictions force investors to maintain their investments in the country to a larger extent and longer than is desirable. Trapped dividends are then invested in low return projects, which gives rise to a negative relationship between equity returns and the repatriation restrictions variable. The inflation variable, INF, finally, is insignificant, which suggests that inflation implies no costs to the non-resident investor other than through a possibly higher capital gains tax liability.1ó
Regressions (2) and (3) correspond more closely to equation (10) in the text, with separate capital gains tax liability variables for dollar and other, inflationary capital gains.
The two regressions differ in that regression (2) only includes a linear MCAP~Y term. Theg a and g parameters are estimated at around 2.8 and 1.8-1.9 respectively, and both are m significant. The significance of the g parameter indicates that inflation independently m contributes to the capital gains tax liability, as reflected in equity returns.
The asset pricing model of section 2 is special in that it is only a one-period model. As realistic investors operate in a multi-period wor(d, there are two difficulties in interpreting the estimates of g~~ga and g~as incidence shares that do not exist in a single period world.
First, the investor's asset holding period does not necessarily correspond to a month. In this instance, the estimated coefficients on the TAXC, TAXCR and TAXCN variables, instead, correspond more closely to the increases during the month, in present value terms, of the capital gains tax liabilities, to be paid at some time in the future. Clearly, the deferment of a tax payment reduces its present value. The postponement of capital gains taxes, therefore, lowers the estimated ccefficients, even if it dces not influence tax incidence shares. A additional difficulty is that the estimated coefficients can also reflect additional information, obtained during the month, on tax liabilities to be incurred in the future. Higher inflation today, for instance, may generally imply higher inflation tomorrow. If so, the estimated coefficient on the TAXCN variable reflects the tax burden associated with a higher capital gains liability incurred today as well tomorrow. Persistence in inflation thus gives rise to a larger estimated coefficients during an initial inflationary period. These difficulties caution against overinterpretation of the actual sizes of the estimated ccefficients.
Uncertainty regarding the timing of liquidation of the investor's assets not only affects the timing of taxes, but also the form these taxes will take. In particular, the longer the investor maintains his position, the larger the share of total returns repatriated as dividends rather than as capital gains. At one extreme, the investor never sells his international assets, and capital gains are never realized. In that instance, all present and future returns will be repatriated as dividends. For this case, the tax liability of an investor incurred during a period can be approximated, as if that period's capital gain are paid out as dividends in that period. For this procedure to be correct, the dividend withholding tax rate has to be constant over time. Let now TAXR be the tax burden incurred during the period on the assumption 12 that all returns are repatriated as dividends against the present dividend withholding tax rate.
In column (4) of Table 3 , TAXR enters the regression with the expected positive sign.
Finally, column (5) is as column (2), with the distinction that the degendent variable is the excess return on a developing country stock market, measured as the rate of appreciation of the IFC dollar index minus the 3-months U.S. T-bill interest rate. The results are very similar to those reported in column (2).
To conclude, we present some regression results where the dependent varíable is the dividend-inclusive dollar return rather than the dollar rate of appreciation. The sample is now restricted to exclude the high-inflation Latin American countries, as for these countries the dividend yield is calculated with distortion. The regressions, reported in Table 4 , inlcude the TAXD variable as an explanatory variable. In other respects, the regressions are exactly as those in Table 3 . All the capital gains TAX variables in the table are estimated with positive coefficients and they are significant. The estimated ccefficients are large, especially for the TAXCN variable. This could be due to the fact that for the countries in the sample higher inflation serves as a signal of higher inflation in the future, leading to substantially higher nominal capital gains tax liabilities. The sample period under consideration, with extreme fluctuations in some emerging stock market, may also contribute to large estimated coefficients.
The TAXD variable enters the regressions of Table 4 with widely varying esimated ccefficients that are not significant. Insignificant ccefficients for the TAXD variable are consistent with the reality that non-resident investors generally are able to obtain off-setting tax credits for foreign withholding taxes from their domestic treasury. A further reason for the imprecise estimation is that for the sample period dividends were rather unimportant as a share of the total return due to the growth stock nature of equity investments in emerging stock markets."
Conclusion
This paper has examined to what extent features of the international tax system and indicators of transaction costs affect the required rates of return in emerging stock markets.
The capital gains withholding tax levied on foreign portfolio investors is shown to increase 13 pre-tax required rates of return. As countries generally do not index their capital gains taxes, it follows that inflation increases the capital gains tax base, and also the required rate of return on equity. Dividend withholding taxes, instead, appear not to significantly increase pre-tax equity returns. These results are consistent with the generally more generous foreign tax credits available in capital-exporting countries, such as the United States, for foreign dividend taxes than for foreign capital gains taxes.
The return on equity is part of the issuing firm's cost of capital. Capital gains withholding taxes imposed on non-residents will therefore increase the cost of capital for domestic firms, and they can discourage physical investment. Unfortunately, private sector investment levels have tended to be low in developing countries in the 1980s. Relative to earlier periods, the cost of equity finance has gained in importance in developing countries, as these countries' access to international lending capital has proven to be restricted over the last decade.
The results of this paper have some implications for the design of tax policy in developing countries. The existence of wider foreign tax credits for dividend taxes paid, in particular, suggests a country shouid tax capital gains lightly in comparison to repatriated dividends1e. This is the policy pursued by Greece, Pakistan, Portugal ar.d Venezuela. Each of these countries has positive dividend withholding taxes but no capital gains taxes imposed on non-residents. Colombia and India, however, do the exact opposite: they tax capital gains heavily compared to dividends. Contrary to what appears optimal, the trend in developing countries is towards lower dividend withholding tazes according to Table 2 , with little change in the average level of capital gains taxation. It also appears desirable for developing countries to index their capital gains taxes to prevent them from being higher than anticipated.
While developing countries have not substantially reduced the taxation barriers to foreign portfolio investment, they have taken steps to improve overall foreign access to the domestic equity market in other important ways. Some countries, specifically, have encouraged foreign equity participation through debt equity swaps, and through the establishment of country equity funds. Foreign ownership restrictions and repatriation restrictions on dividend and capital returns have also generally been relaxed over the last decade. 14 The assertion that capital gains taxes increase the required pre-tax return on portfolio investment in emerging equity markets should hold equally for developed countries. A capital gains tax cut for U.S. equities can, therefore, be expected to lower the required rate of return on U.S. equities, with a concomitant reduction in the cost of capital of U.S. firms.19 It may be impossible, however, to infer the impact of capital gains taxes on equiry returns for a single country, as there is very little variation in the capital gains tax rate. For the developed countries as a group, however, tests similar to those in this paper should be possible.
In addition to taxes, there are other costs to investors associated with international portfolio investments for which they need to be compensated. A country's market capitalization to GDP ratio is shown to be a good indicator of these costs. In particular, international equity returns are negatively related to the equiry market's market capitalization to GDP ratio. The data, however, do not enable us to state whether this relationship is due to variation in direct transactions costs, or whether a high market capitalization~GDP ratio reflects favorable equity market practice~in the area of accounting practices and other rules and regulations. [nternational differences in consumption pattetns and the non-tradeability of human capital point at other possible reasons for investors to hold primarily domestic assets.
2. The U.S. investor is in fact assumed to be invested in the I8 developing country emerging stock markets investigated in this study. In practice, foreign residents frequently invest in country funds. In these cases, it is reasonable to assume that a foreign investor invests in the broader market rather than simply in a limited number of stocks. The values of country funds in 1990 range from around 0.2 per cent of market capitalization for countries such as Korea and Turkey, to 0.6 per cent for Chile and [ndonesia, and to I.0 and 2.0 per cent for Mexico and Thailand respectively. Systematic information on the volume of non-country fund investment by nonresidents in emerging stock markets is not available.
3. The implications of the tax systems in the developing countries themselves on equity pricing can be ignored, as the wealth of developing country investors is negligible in comparison to U.S. investors' wealth. The tax systems of the developed countries, other than the U.S., can equally be ignored in so far as these countríes' tax treatments of emerging market equity eatnings is roughly comparable to the U.S treatment.
4. The limitations of this assumption for the empirical work are discussed in section 4.
5. As the paper is concerned with passive portfolio investments, foreign dividend income is tazed in the U.S. regardless of whether it is reinvested. It is assumed the U.S. investor indeed reports his foreign investment income in the U.S.. If tax is evaded then clearly a credit will not be obtained. Finally, interest is not taxed and cannot be expensed abroad. These assumptions sidestep existing national rules for aflocating interest expense to different income sources.
6. U.S. foreign tax credits can only be used to offset U.S. taxes on foreign source income in the same income basket. Credit limitations may be binding more quickly for institutional investors that pay little U.S. tax.
7. The securities that comprise an equity market are taken to be a single asset. This paper, therefore, abstracts from selective investments in foreign equity markets.
8. This is because it is difficult to accurately compute the appropriate withholding tax rates. Transaction costs associated with holding the market portfolio similarly are ignored in the empirical work.
9. In the empirical work, P; is taken to be the consumer price index. 12. Capital gains tax rates for domestic residents display a close correlation with those imposed on foreign residents. Nigeria, for instance, has a flat capital gains tax of 20 per cent imposed on residents as well as non-residents. A number of countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, India and Korea tax capital gains as ordinary income, and hence the marginal tax rate depends on the person's ls income level. Chile and Mexico allow for adjustments of capital gains for inflation. Colombia and Turkey distinguish between short term (less than 2 and l year(s) respectively) and long term capital gains. Short term capital gains are counted as ordinary income, while long term capital gains are taxed at a lower rate. Argentina has no capital gains tax on marketable securities for residents, even though it taxes capital gains accruing to foreign residents. Malaysia, Portugal and Greece do not tax domestic capital gains. Sources: latest country guides of the 'Doing Business in ..' series of Price Waterhouse.
l3. This means that capital gains withholding tax rates for Argentina and Chile for the years 1990-1991 and 1987-1989 , respectively, in which only inflation-adjusted capital gains were taxed, are excluded.
14. To be precise, the included TAX variables are TAXC for the regressions underlying Table 3 , and TAXC and TAXD for the regressions underlying l6. Some alternative indicators of equity market development such as qualitative information regarding the quality of accounting standards, and the existence of a government agency concentrating on regulating market activity and the extent of investor protection generally proved not to be important in determining stock market returns. These unreported results only demonstrate that these additional indicators of market development do not affect returns on financial capital. The results, however, do not rule out that the indicators are related to the returns on physical investment if they in part reflect the cost sttvcture of the firm.
17. Finally, as mentioned, there are some difficulties is constructing dividend yields in inflationary economies.
18. This is on the assumption that the developed countries will not significantly limit the credibility of foreign dividend taxes after these are raised. The paper has not been concerned with the use of taxes on foreign investors with the aim of exploiting a country's market power. In the presence of such power dividend taxes could equally well be used to the national advantage.
19. Of coutse, the relationship between the capital gains tax and equity returns is only one aspect of a larger debate that includes the overall distributive implications.
Appendix. Variable Definitions and Sources
Basic variables: 
ó~.
-. Reported are the yearly mean values for the countries in the sample (see Table 1 ). Variable definitions and sources are given in the Appendix. The dependent variable is G, the dollaz capital gains rate of return, in specifications 1~, and the G-R,,, the ezcess return in the last specification. Not reported above aze country and (adjusted) month dummy variables. Regressions also include the world rate of return (ezcess return in specification 5), with a ccefficient that is allowed to vary across countries. The second reported error in parentheses is White's standard error. " and ' indicate that the ccefficient is significantly different from zero a[ l and 5 petrxnt levels, respectively, based on Whi[e's standard errors. Variable definitions and sources are given in the Appendia. The dependent varia5le is R, the rate of return, in specifications I-4, and R-R,, , the excess rate of retutn in the last specification. Not reported above are country and (adjusted) month dummy variables. Regressions also include the world rate of return (excess retum in specification 5), with a ccefficient that is allowed to vary across coun[ries. The second reported erzor in parentheses is White's standard erzor. " ' and q indicate that [he coefficient is significandy different from zero at l, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively, based on White's standazd errors. Variable definitions and sources are given in the Appendix. 
